There are different theoretical models that try to explain the functioning of the human mind . One of them is the model or computer theory of the mind, which uses the metaphor of the computer to support the idea that our cognitive system processes information in the same way that a computer does.

In this article we talk about the computational theory of mind, what other theoretical and philosophical frameworks it draws on, what its most prominent authors are, and what kind of criticisms it has received.

Background to the computational theory of mind

The computational theory of mind is part of cognitive psychology, which studies the functioning of human cognition; that is, how people process, transform, encode, store, retrieve and use the information they receive from their environment.

Computationalism, proposed by Hilary Putnam in the 1960s, is situated within cognitive psychology and understands that the functional architecture of human cognition is close to how it is understood from models of information processing and artificial intelligence.

The formal bases of the computational theory of mind are based, on the one hand, on the mathematical formalism that conceived a discipline such as mathematics as the art of manipulating symbols through ,starting from formal rules; and on the other hand, on Alan Turing’s experiments, which implemented a mathematical model that consisted of an automaton capable of constructing any mathematical problem expressed through algorithms.

Computationalism also feeds on the synthesis of two philosophical positions: intentional realism and physicalism . The first postulates the existence of mental states and intrinsic intentionality as part of the natural order of things, as well as the propositional attitude or the way people behave with respect to such propositions; and physicalism assumes that everything that exists has a physical and material entity.

Basic Principles of Computationalism

The computational model is based on a series of basic principles that can help to better understand how it works . Let’s see what they are:

  • The human mind is a complex biological machine that processes symbols.

  • Cognition is understood as a system that sequentially processes symbolic information from a set of rules stored in the form of
    “logic programs.”

  • Cognitive systems and computers receive, encode, transform, store and retrieve information following certain computational rules, working with a digital code, just like propositional representation.

  • Human and computer cognition are different structures (from the material point of view), but functionally equivalent.

  • The processing of propositional information, both for a computer and for the human mind, follows a sequential process and some calculation rules (algorithms).

The works of Noam Chomsky

The computational model of the mind was initially based on the theoretical proposals of Noam Chomsky and his generative grammar, which is based on the idea that, along with the specific rules of sentence construction specific to each language, there are more basic rules (innate and common to all languages) that explain the ease with which we learn language from childhood.

According to Chomsky, all sentences have a deep structure (which contains their meaning) and another superficial structure (the way the sentence is presented, as it is expressed). The deep structure would be abstract and the superficial one would shape the physical or material reality of the language.

Chomsky also distinguished between a person’s ability to associate sounds and meanings with certain unconscious and automatic rules, and linguistic performance, which refers to the way a particular sentence or language is interpreted and understood.

However, the theories of the popular linguist served to underpin the computational theory developed by Jerry Fodor and which we will see below.

Fodor’s Computer Theory of Mind

The computational theory of mind postulates that the functioning of the human mind is similar to that of a computer , the brain being the hardware of the information processing system. This theory combines the explanation of how we reason and how mental states work, and is also known as the “representational theory of mind”.

According to the philosopher Jerry Fodor, one of the greatest exponents of the theory, the mental is intentional and can also be reduced to the physical. For this author, the human mind resembles a digital computer; that is, a device that stores symbolic representations and manipulates them by means of a series of syntactic rules.

Thoughts would therefore be mental representations which, in turn, function as symbols of the “language of thought”; and mental processes or states would be causal sequences guided by the syntactic (and not semantic) properties of the symbols. Fodor also defended the existence of the innate private language, different from the rest of the natural languages or human languages.

Internal vs. natural language

The private and innate language would be used to perform the calculations and computations that are at the base of human behavior . To explain the existence of it, Fodor uses a simile with the languages used by a computer: the input language and the output language, which are the ones we use to enter data and read those provided by the computer back; that is, the way the computer communicates with its environment.

These two input and output languages are opposed by machine language, which is understood by the computer and with which it performs its calculations and operations. Between both languages there are so-called compiler programs, which mediate or translate between them.

For Fodor, people’s private language can be compared to machine language; therefore, public languages or natural languages (Spanish, English, French, etc.) would be similar to computer programming languages. Well, this language of thought would be an internal language and prior to the public or natural languages, just as it happens with the machine language in a computer that must be previously installed to any input/output language.

Criticism of the theory

The ideas of Fodor and of computationalism in general, have not been exempt from criticism throughout the last years . Although the idea that mental states are intentional is admitted, what is debatable for some scientists is the fact that such representations are manipulated by means of calculations and computations.

The philosopher Daniel Dennett considers that the computational theory of mind is empirically implausible, because a brain that manipulates computational symbols does not appear to be entirely biological. He does, however, advocate “neural determinism,” which involves assuming that neural activity precedes “free” decisions and that consciousness is only an epiphenomenon which, at best, has the evolutionary function of serving as a control and monitoring mechanism for processes of adaptation to the environment.

On the other hand, the philosopher Patricia S. Churchland is equally critical of computational postulates and considers that the emergence of the language of innate thought does not seem very sensitive to evolutionary considerations, since the system has to operate with formal or syntactic rules to manipulate representations, and every aspect of the meaning of a symbol that affects psychological processing must be formally codified.

If the cognitive system works exclusively according to syntactic principles, it cannot have access to the contexts that, in natural language, serve to eliminate ambiguities in the different meanings of the term. Furthermore, if every state of mind is to be understood as some form of storage or processing of a sentence in the language of thought, people would need an infinite number of sentences stored in our minds.

In summary, there remains a problem with the nature of intentionality that has not yet been fully resolved , despite attempts by computer theory to show, through the mind/computer metaphor, that physical systems can arise from intentional states.

Bibliographic references:

  • Horst, S. (1999). Symbols and computation a critique of the computational theory of mind. Minds and Machines, 9(3), 347-381.

  • Horst, S. (2011). The computational theory of mind. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

  • Ludwig, K., & Schneider, S. (2008). Fodor’s challenge to the classical computational theory of mind. Mind & Language, 23(1), 123-143.

  • Pinker, S. (2005). So how does the mind work? Mind & Language, 20(1), 1-24.